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The Next Reapportionment Revolution
ASHIRA PELMAN OSTROW*
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court famously imposed the one-person, one-vote requirement on federal, state, and local legislatures. The doctrine rapidly resolved the
problem of malapportioned districts. Within just a few years, legislatures across the
nation were reapportioned to equalize the population between districts. Sadly, however, the national commitment to equal-population districts has led directly to the
current crisis of political gerrymandering. The boundaries of equal-population districts must be redrawn every ten years to maintain population equality. Even with
rigid adherence to population requirements, district boundaries are easily manipulated to secure incumbent seats and advance partisan interests. Redistricting is
rightly condemned for allowing politicians to pick their voters, instead of the other
way around. Rather than reform the redistricting process, this Article proposes eliminating it by using weighted voting to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement. To that end, this Article identifies several innovative countywide apportionment plans that use political units as electoral districts and allocate legislative votes
to each district in proportion to its population. Weighted voting eliminates the need
for strict population equality and enables the formation of fixed districts that reflect
multiple dimensions of political representation. The Supreme Court’s notably flexible approach to the one-person, one-vote requirement at the local level grants local
governments substantial discretion to experiment with local political institutions and
electoral arrangements. Policy innovations that succeed in one locality can spread
to others and stimulate change at the state and national level. This Article seeks to
stimulate change at the state and national level by drawing attention to local
weighted-voting apportionment plans.
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In the 1960s, the Supreme Court entered the political thicket of legislative apportionment to confront the problem of malapportioned districts.1 In Reynolds v. Sims,2
the Court required state legislatures to be apportioned according to population, so
that each voter had a numerically equally weighted vote. 3 The one-person, one-vote
requirement famously triggered a reapportionment revolution. 4 Within just a few
years, legislatures across the nation were reapportioned to equalize the population
between districts.5 Sadly, however, the national commitment to equal-population districting has led directly to the current crisis of political gerrymandering. 6 The boundaries of single-member, equal-population districts must be redrawn after each decennial census to maintain population equality.7 Even with rigid adherence to population
requirements, district boundaries are drawn to secure incumbent seats and advance
partisan interests. Redistricting is rightly condemned for allowing politicians to
choose their voters, rather than the other way around. 8
Rather than reform the redistricting process, this Article proposes eliminating it
by using weighted voting to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement.
Weighted voting alters the politics of legislative apportionment, avoiding endless
battles over district lines by simply adjusting the number of votes allocated to each

1.
2.
3.
4.

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199–200 (1962).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 565.
See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION,
POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966) (coining the phrase to describe the rapid
reapportionment of legislative bodies to equalize the population of each district in response to
the one-person, one-vote requirement).
5. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, One Person, One Weighted Vote, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1839, 1842–
43 (2016) (explaining that following the reapportionment cases equal-population districts became the norm).
6. Id. at 1854–56.
7. For an overview of the redistricting process, see generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 (2009).
8. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1854–56.
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district.9 This Article examines the evolution of countywide weighted-voting plans,
demonstrating that local legislatures use weighted voting to maintain fixed electoral
districts that prevent malapportionment and gerrymandering. Weighted voting can
be used to preserve representation for whole political units, such as towns, on a
county board. It can also be incorporated into multimember districts or equal-population districts to equalize the numeric weight of each vote across unequal-population
districts. Weighted voting eliminates the need for strict population equality,
dramatically increasing the options for legislative apportionment and enabling the
formation of electoral districts that achieve multiple districting objectives.10
In 1968, in Avery v. Midland County, the Supreme Court extended the one-person,
one-vote requirement to local legislatures.11 Despite early apprehension over its impact on local governance, the extension of the one-person, one-vote doctrine has done
little to constrain local experimentation with government formation and electoral
processes.12 Instead, the Court has gone out of its way to acknowledge “the immense
pressures facing units of local government, and of the greatly varying problems with
which they must deal,”13 and to limit its own application of the one-person, one-vote
requirement to enable local governments to respond to local circumstances. 14

9. Id. at 1840; see also Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political
Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1836–37 (2012) (noting that “redistricting is bedeviled by the
sore loser problem: because new district lines can determine the electoral fates of candidates,
political parties, and interest groups, it is usually worth their time and effort to overturn a plan
that they do not like for the uncertain prospect of something better”).
10. This Article thus follows the recent “institutional turn in election law scholarship,”
proposing a nonjudicial strategy for preventing gerrymandering. See generally Heather K.
Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship, in RACE,
REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 86, 90–100 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds.,
2011) (describing proposals that avoid judicial review and “harness politics to fix politics”);
Cain, supra note 9, at 1810–11 (providing an overview of proposals designed to lessen court
involvement by improving the political process); Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections:
Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 699
(2006) (arguing that “[t]he need for political answers in redistricting ought to guide reform
toward new institutional approaches”).
11. 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).
12. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local
Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 339–40 (1993) (noting concern that “rigid application
of federal constitutional principles could deprive states and localities of the flexibility essential
to make local governments responsive to the tremendous diversity of local conditions” but
finding that states “retain considerable control over the organization and structure of local
governments”); Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Government, “One Person, One Vote,” and the
Jewish Question, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2014) (analyzing extension of one person, one vote to local elections).
13. Avery, 390 U.S. at 485.
14. See, e.g., Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967) (“Viable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great
flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions.”); Abate v. Mundt,
403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971) (quoting Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110–11); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist.
of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1970) (quoting Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110–11);
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Thus, while the one-person, one-vote requirement virtually eliminated variation
in Congress and at the state level,15 local governments have continued to experiment
with legislative apportionment and voting rights.16 In particular, some local legislatures use weighted voting to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement while
preserving representation for fixed political subdivisions.17 Some rural counties use
a “one town, one representative” system under which each town elects one representative regardless of the town’s population. 18 Thus, a supervisor whose town contains ten percent of the total county population casts ten percent of the votes on the
county board. The federal courts have upheld this format, explaining that this
“method of local governance preserves not only traditional boundaries and local allegiances, but assures that no voter is effectively disenfranchised by reason of place
of residence.”19
Nonetheless, in counties with district that vary substantially in population, the
“one-town, one-representative” model can lead to constitutionally significant inequality in legislative representation, or what I have previously described as functional

accord Greenwald v. Bd. of Supervisors, 567 F. Supp. 200, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“The flexibility which is to be afforded municipal government schemes has been repeatedly
stressed . . . .”).
15. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1845; see also James A. Gardner, How To Do Things with
Boundaries: Redistricting and the Construction of Politics, 11 ELECTION L.J. 399, 402 (2012);
Jeffrey C. O’Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not Necessarily Count: The Right
to Vote and the Choice of a Voting System, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 332 (2006); Nicholas
O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379,
1406 (2012).
16. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Dual Resident Voting: Traditional Disenfranchisement
and Prospects for Change, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1954, 1965 (2002) (distinguishing local elections from state and national elections); see also Steve Bickerstaff, Making Local Redistricting
Less Political: Independent Redistricting Commissions for U.S. Cities, 13 ELECTION L.J. 419,
421 (2014) (noting variations in municipal structure); Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local
Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 3 (2006) (emphasizing the “capacity of local governments to restructure basic features of their political organization, and their interest in doing
so”); Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1039,
1045–69 (2017) (noting local expansions of the right to vote); Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out:
A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33
HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 333, 339–43 (1998) (noting use of alternative voting systems at the
local level); O’Neill, supra note 15, at 333 (“Local elections may be any combination of single-member and multi-member districts.”).
17. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1850–51 (describing emergence of weighted voting in New
York); see also R. Alta Charo, Designing Mathematical Models to Describe One-Person, OneVote Compliance by Unique Governmental Structures: The Case of the New York City Board
of Estimate, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 784 (1985) (describing use of weighted voting to
preserve town-based representation on county board); Bernard Grofman & Howard Scarrow,
Weighted Voting in New York, 6 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 287, 288–89 (1981) (identifying unique
circumstances that led to weighted voting in New York).
18. See Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1850–51.
19. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 244
(N.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996).
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vote dilution.20 Consider a county in which the smallest town contains five percent
of the population and the largest town contains forty percent of the population. If
each town elects a single representative, residents of both towns will be
underrepresented in different ways. Residents of the smaller town will be
underrepresented because a legislator with fewer votes will have less political power
and less opportunity to influence legislative outcomes.21 Residents of the larger town
will also be underrepresented, first, because they have fewer actual representatives
in the legislative body to advocate on their behalf and, second, because a representative serving a larger constituency will have less time to devote to each individual
resident.22
Counties using weighted voting address this concern in a variety of ways. Some
combine weighted voting with roughly equal-population districts, subdividing
densely populated cities into districts each of which elects its own representative. 23
Others combine weighted voting with multimember districts, increasing the number
of representatives each district elects in proportion to the district’s population. 24 Still
others have replaced their weighted-voting systems with equal-population districts
when extreme inequalities in legislative representation could not be reduced.25
Remarkably, in just the few years following the 2010 census, one county adopted
weighted voting for the first time; 26 a second county voted to replace its weightedvoting system with a county legislature;27 and several other counties modified their
plans, tinkering with the size of the legislative body or the allocation of weighted
votes.28

20. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1862–64.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., CORTLAND CTY. PLANNING DEP’T, LEGISLATIVE AND ELECTION DISTRICTS
(2013); see also Slater v. Bd. of Supervisors of Cortland, 330 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948–50 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1972), aff’d, 346 N.Y.S.2d 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (upholding Cortland County’s
apportionment plan); infra Part III.B.
24. See e.g., SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y., CHARTER art. II § 2.04(F) (2015); Michael
Lamendola, Schenectady County Legislature Pushes for Weighted Voting, DAILY GAZETTE
(Apr. 12, 2011), https://dailygazette.com/article/2011/04/12/0412_weighted [https://perma.cc
/AD2M-5ARB]; infra Part III.B.1.
25. See Jackson v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509, 531–34 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
26. See SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y. CHARTER art. II, § 2.04 (2015) (amending county charter to incorporate weighted voting).
27. See MONTGOMERY CTY., N.Y. CHARTER art. 2, § 2.01 (2012) (“The County legislature
shall consist of nine (9) members elected from single-member districts.”); see also Notice of
Adoption, Montgomery Cty., N.Y., in LOCAL LAW FILING OF LOCAL LAW NO. 2 OF 2012, at 34
(2012), https://www.co.montgomery.ny.us/sites/public/government/locallaws/LocalLawScans
/023.pdf (explaining charter amendment that “change[d] county government by abolishing the
Board of Supervisors and replacing it with a nine member Legislature . . . elected from nine
equally sized districts,” that “eliminate the need for weighted voting and comply with the principle of ‘one man one vote’”).
28. CORTLAND COUNTY, N.Y., RULES OF ORDER art. XI (2014); Legislative and
Election Districts, CORTLAND COUNTY (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (maintaining
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Although the Court has held that partisan gerrymandering can violate the
Constitution, it has yet to develop a manageable standard for determining when that
occurs.29 While the Court continues its search, this Article proposes an alternative
apportionment strategy that prevents gerrymandering and furthers numerous districting priorities that would otherwise conflict. As this Article explains, weighted-voting
districts accomplish the seemingly impossible. They preserve political subdivisions,
prevent gerrymandering, provide equal functional representation, increase minority
representation, and satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.
Part I demonstrates that weighted voting is uniquely able to satisfy the quantitative
one-person, one-vote requirement. Weighted-voting plans grant each district a percentage of the total number of votes that corresponds precisely with its percentage of
the total population. As a result, there is zero percent deviation from population
equality. Regardless of each district’s shape or population, weighted voting equalizes
the numeric weight of each vote, thus satisfying the quantitative one-person, onevote requirement.
Part II considers the extension of the one-person, one-vote doctrine to local elections. This Part notes that Court has tailored its application of the one-person, onevote requirement to accommodate a wide range of local political conditions, exempting many political units from the one-person, one-vote requirement, and granting
local legislatures substantial discretion to craft districts that reflect local political
preferences. This Part argues that the Court’s notably flexible approach facilitates
local political experimentation and innovation that could, in turn, serve as a model
for broader state and national reforms.
Part III critically examines the evolution of weighted-voting plans. First, this Part
analyzes the “one town, one representative” model in which each town is represented
by a single legislator. Next, this Part identifies hybrid-weighted-voting plans that

weighted-voting system but reducing the size of its legislature); MADISON CTY. BD. OF
SUPERVISORS, ORGANIZATION & BOARD MEETING AGENDA FOR JANUARY 8, 2013 (2013) (on
file with the Indiana Law Journal) (passing resolution maintaining weighted-voting
system); Lohr McKinstry, Slight Power Shift, PRESS REPUBLICAN (Apr. 13, 2012), http://
www.pressrepublican.com/news/local_news/slight-power-shift/article_16140991-dc495e84-aaa6-cfbda4470f50.html [https://perma.cc/AF6K-NYJU] (noting that Essex County
adjusted the allocation of votes on its Board in accordance with the Banzhaf Index of voting
power); Stephen Williams, Saratoga County Board Votes Against Expanding Its Ranks,
DAILY GAZETTE (Aug. 17, 2011), https://dailygazette.com/article/2011/08/17/0817
_board [https://perma.cc/7M5T-4FKB]; JAMES R. RUHL, SARATOGA COUNTY GOVERNMENT
FUNDAMENTALS 2 (Jan. 20, 2009) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (noting that
Saratoga County increased the number of residents each legislator represents to avoid increasing the size of its Board).
29. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018) (“Over the past five decades this Court
has repeatedly been asked to decide what judicially enforceable limits, if any, the Constitution
sets on partisan gerrymandering. Previous attempts at an answer have left few clear landmarks
for addressing the question and have generated conflicting views both of how to conceive of
the injury arising from partisan gerrymandering and of the appropriate role for the Federal
Judiciary in remedying that injury.”); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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equalize multiple dimensions of legislative representation by combining weightedvoting with multimember or equal-population plans. Finally, this Part examines
weighted-voting plans that equalize voting power, or the mathematic probability of
determining the outcome of a vote, rather than the numeric weight of each vote. 30
Part IV argues that hybrid weighted-voting plans maximize the advantages of
each apportionment system and should serve as a model for broader state and national
reform. Equal-population and multimember districts provide equal functional representation because each legislator represents roughly the same number of people and
casts roughly the same number of votes. Weighted voting prevents racial and partisan
gerrymandering, satisfying the one-person, one-vote requirement by allocating votes
to each district in proportion to its population, rather than by redrawing the boundaries of each district.
I. WEIGHTED VOTING AND THE ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE REQUIREMENT
The Court often refers to the “one person, one vote requirement” as the “equalpopulation requirement.”31 This nomenclature is misleading. The one-person, onevote doctrine requires mathematically equally weighted votes.32 It does not require
equal-population districts.33 In Reynolds v. Sims,34 the Court held that a plan in which
disparately sized districts each had a single vote in the legislative body violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 The Court noted that a state
could preserve representation for political subdivisions that vary in size by increasing
the legislative representation of more populous districts. 36
Multimember districts and weighted-voting districts are designed to preserve representation for political subdivisions that vary in size by allocating legislative votes
to each district in proportion to the district’s population. 37 Multimember districts increase the number of representatives each district elects; weighted-voting districts
increase the number of votes each representative casts. 38 To illustrate, assume that

30. See infra Part III.C; see also John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A
Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 317 (1965) (developing voting power model);
Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1888, 1893 (2012) (explaining that one way
to conceptualize the “weight” of a vote is as “the probability that I might cast the decisive
vote”).
31. See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016) (“Wesberry and Reynolds
together instructed that jurisdictions must design both congressional and state-legislative districts with equal populations . . . .” (emphasis added)); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949 (2004)
(mem.) (referring to one person, one vote as “the equal-population principle”); NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 7, at 22–45 (discussing the “constitutional
requirement of equal population among state legislative and congressional districts”).
32. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1846–47.
33. Id.
34. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
35. Id. at 568.
36. Id. at 549.
37. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1846–47.
38. Id. at 1847.
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an equal-population district contains 1000 people. Its residents would elect one representative who would cast one vote. Residents of a multimember district with 2000
residents would elect two representatives, each of whom would cast a single vote.
Residents of a weighted-voting district with 2000 people would elect one representative who would cast two votes. In each district, the mathematic ratio of people to
legislative votes is 1000 to 1. Although the populations vary, the votes are numerically equal.39
Both multimember and weighted-voting plans use proportional representation to
equalize the weight of each vote. Because weighted voting varies the number of
votes, rather than the number of members, it is a far more precise mathematic tool.
A district with 6.6% of the population can be granted precisely 6.6% of the votes. It
cannot be granted 6.6 members. In a multimember system, the number of members
must be rounded up to 7. The rounding process can produce deviations from population equality that exceed the constitutionally permissible threshold.
This Part demonstrates that weighted voting is uniquely able to satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.40 Subpart A briefly reviews the problem
of malapportioned districts that gave rise to the quantitative one-person, one-vote
doctrine. Subpart B notes that the Court regularly permits state and local apportionment plans to deviate from population equality to preserve the integrity of political
subdivisions. Thus, the Court (1) presumes that state and local apportionment plans
that deviate by less than ten percent comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement and (2) permits state and local legislatures to use proportional representation to
preserve representation for political subdivisions.
Subpart C compares the mathematics of weighted-voting to multimember districting, noting that multimember systems frequently generate impermissibly high deviations from population equality or require the formation of unreasonably large legislatures. Subpart D considers the implications of weighted voting on other dimensions
of legislative representation. In particular, this Subpart notes that varying the number
of votes each legislator casts, and correspondingly, the number of people each legislator represents, creates inequality in functional representation and legislator power,
and increases the risk of minority vote dilution.
A. The Problem of Malapportioned Districts
In its one-person, one-vote cases, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the problem
of malapportioned districts.41 During the first half of the 1900s, the nation’s population began to shift from rural to urban areas. State legislatures charged with redis-

39. Id.
40. See id. at 1846–47.
41. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124–26 (2016) (reviewing history of the
one-person, one-vote doctrine); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra
note 7, at 105–06; Grant M. Hayden, The Supreme Court and Voting Rights: A More Complete
Exit Strategy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 949, 950 (2005) (providing an overview of one person, one
vote).

2018]

THE NEX T RE A PP OR TI ON ME N T R EVO L UTI O N

1041

tricting state and congressional legislative districts refused to adjust district boundaries to account for these demographic changes. 42 Many states used legislative maps
drawn to equalize population as it existed at the turn of the century. 43 Others allocated
a single representative to each county, regardless of its population.44 In Alabama, for
example, an urban county with over 600,000 residents and a rural county with only
15,000 residents each elected one representative to the state senate.45 Throughout the
country, urban voters, who were disproportionately members of minority groups, had
their votes numerically diluted.46
For decades, the Supreme Court refused to intervene, holding that electoral districting was a nonjusticiable political question.47 “The remedy for unfairness in districting,” the Court maintained, “is to secure State legislatures that will apportion
properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.” 48 Yet, the political process
provided no obvious solution. Rural legislators had no incentive to adopt new maps
that might diminish their power. Thus, in 1962, in Baker v. Carr,49 the Court entered
the political thicket of legislative districting. In Baker, the Court overturned its earlier
precedent and found that the Tennessee legislature’s failure to redistrict gave rise to
a justiciable issue under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 One year later, in Gray v.
Sanders, the Court declared that “[t]he conception of political equality . . . can mean
only one thing—one person, one vote.”51
The Court developed the details of the one-person, one-vote standard in the cases
that followed. First, in Wesberry v. Sanders,52 the Court invalidated Georgia’s congressional district map, under which one congressional district was “two to three
times” larger than the others.53 The Court interpreted Article I, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which commands that representatives be chosen “by the people of the
several States,” to mean that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”54 Later that same Term, in
Reynolds v. Sims,55 the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that state

42. See Hayden, supra note 41, at 955 n.36 (citing PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH EISENBERG,
DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE 3 (1961)); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela
S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 541, 543 (2004).
43. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1123.
44. See id.
45. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 546 (1964) (discussing population disparities).
46. See Hayden, supra note 41, at 955 n.36.
47. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552, 556 (1946) (warning that courts are “not to
enter this political thicket”).
48. Id. at 556.
49. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
50. Id. at 237 (“We conclude that the complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a
trial and a decision.”).
51. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
52. 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
53. Id. at 7, 18.
54. Id. at 7–8 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
55. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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legislative seats be apportioned on a population basis so that each person has an
equally weighted vote.56 Finally, in Avery v. Midland County, the Supreme Court
extended the holding in Reynolds to local legislatures, requiring cities, towns and
counties to be apportioned on a population basis.57 Thus, by the end of the decade,
legislatures at every level of government—federal, state, and local—were subject to
the one-person, one-vote requirement.
B. Equally Weighted Votes
1. The Maximum Deviation from Population Equality
Courts typically determine whether an apportionment plan satisfies the constitutional one-person, one-vote requirement by calculating the plan’s “maximum deviation from population equality.”58 The maximum deviation is the total range between
the most over- and underrepresented districts. If the largest district is two percent
larger than the ideal, and the smallest district is one percent smaller than the ideal,
then the overall range, or maximum population deviation, is three percent.59 The oneperson, one-vote requirement is satisfied so long as a plan’s maximum population
deviation falls within a constitutionally acceptable range.
Over time, the Court has developed different numeric requirements for congressional districts versus state and local legislative districts.60 At the national level, the
Court insists that congressional districts be precisely equal. 61 The Court has rejected
the suggestion that there is a point at which population differences between congressional districts are de minimus.62 Where congressional districts vary from precise
mathematic equality, the state must either show that the variances are unavoidable or
specifically justify the variances.63 In Karcher v. Daggett, for example, the Court

56. Id. at 568.
57. 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968) (requiring county to allocate seats on a population basis).
58. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 n.2, 1149 (2016) (“Maximum population
deviation is the sum of the percentage deviations from perfect population equality of the mostand least-populated districts.”). Courts refer to this range in a variety of ways. See, e.g.,
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 99 (1997) (“overall population deviation”); Bd. of Estimate
of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 700 (1989) (“maximum percentage deviation”); Connor v.
Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 416 (1977) (“maximum deviation”); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 23
(1975) (“deviation,” “variation,” and “total population variance”).
59. See also Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124 n.2 (“[I]f the largest district is 4.5% overpopulated, and the smallest district is 2.3% underpopulated, the map’s maximum population deviation is 6.8%.”).
60. See id. at 1149; see also Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973) (noting that,
while “population alone has been the sole criterion of constitutionality in congressional redistricting . . . broader latitude has been afforded the States under the Equal Protection Clause in
state legislative redistricting”).
61. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795–97 (1973) (invalidating districts that
were not as mathematically equal as possible).
62. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531–32 (1969) (rejecting suggestion of de
minimis population differences among congressional districts).
63. Id. at 531.
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rejected New Jersey’s congressional reapportionment plan that deviated by less than
one percent from population equality because the plan’s opponents were able to
demonstrate that an alternative plan would have produced a slightly lower deviation.64
In state and local apportionment plans, however, the Court has adopted a more
flexible approach, establishing a presumption of constitutionality for plans that deviate by less than ten percent from population equality.65 The Court permits state and
local districts to deviate from the ideal size to “accommodate traditional districting
objectives,” such as “preserving the integrity of political subdivisions, maintaining
communities of interest, and creating geographic compactness.”66 The Court has embraced an even more flexible approach in its review of local districting plans, cautioning that “[a]n unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures” may cause
courts to overlook other factors more critical to an “acceptable representation and
apportionment arrangement.”67
2. Proportional Representation in State and Local Legislatures
Under federal law, congressional representatives must be elected from singlemember, equal-population districts.68 In contrast, state and local representatives can
be elected from multimember districts that vary in size. In Fortson v. Dorsey,69 for
example, the Court upheld a state redistricting plan that consisted of a mixture of
multimember and single-member districts. The Fortson Court expressly rejected the
claim that the Equal Protection Clause requires equal-population districts.70
Although the districts varied in size, the Court determined that the plan provided each
person with an equally weighted vote.71 There is “clearly no mathematical disparity”

64. 462 U.S. 725, 742–44 (1983).
65. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124 (“Where the maximum population deviation between the
largest and smallest district is less than 10%, the Court has held, a state or local legislative
map presumptively complies with the one-person, one-vote rule.”); see also Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161 (1993) (noting a ten percent threshold); Brown v. Thomson, 462
U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (“[A]n apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under
10% falls within this category of minor deviations.”).
66. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124; see also Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973)
(approving a state-legislative map with maximum population deviation of sixteen percent to
accommodate the State’s interest in “maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines,”
but cautioning that this deviation “may well approach tolerable limits”); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (permitting variation “based on legitimate considerations incident
to the effectuation of a rational state policy”).
67. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973); see also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S.
182, 184–86 (1971) (stating that “slightly greater percentage deviations may be tolerable” at
the local level because local legislative bodies have fewer representatives and smaller districts).
68. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a), (c) (2012) (requiring single-member, equal-population districts
for congressional representatives).
69. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
70. Id. at 438–39.
71. Id.
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in the weight of each vote, the Court explained, because each district elects a number
of representatives in proportion to its population.72 As a result, the plan satisfied the
one-person, one-vote requirement.73
In 1971, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Supreme Court again held that multimember
districts could be used to satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.74
The plaintiffs in Whitcomb argued that multimember districts do not provide each
person with an equal vote because a voter in a multimember district has statistically
“more chances to determine election outcomes than does the voter in the singlemember district.”75 The Supreme Court rejected this statistical argument and held
that multimember districts satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.76
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of
weighted voting, the lower federal courts have held that weighted voting can be used
to satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.77 In Roxbury Taxpayers
Alliance v. Delaware County Board of Supervisors,78 the Second Circuit rejected the
claim that the one-person, one-vote doctrine requires equal-population districts and
held that weighted voting satisfies the requirement so long as votes are allocated in
proportion to population.79 The federal courts have also required counties to adopt
weighted-voting schemes to remedy malapportioned districts. In 2001, for example,
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York ordered Erie County to
maintain its existing districts and use weighted voting to comply with the one-person,
one-vote requirement.80
In addition, the Supreme Court has indirectly held that weighted voting does not
violate the federal Equal Protection Clause. In 1973, in Franklin v. Krause,81 the New
York Court of Appeals upheld Nassau County’s weighted-voting scheme against an
Equal Protection challenge.82 The Franklin court emphasized the Supreme Court’s
tolerance for flexible local governance structures and the value of preserving representation for political subunits—towns and cities—on the County Board.83 The

72. Id. at 437.
73. Id. at 438–39; see also Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson,
384 U.S. 73 (1966).
74. 403 U.S. 124, 145 (1971).
75. Id. at 147, 168–69.
76. Id. at 145–47.
77. See, e.g., Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d
Cir. 1996); Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Schoharie Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 975 F. Supp. 191,
194–95 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
78. 80 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996).
79. Roxbury Taxpayers All., 80 F.3d at 48.
80. Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(SR), 2001 WL 967552, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 8, 2001); see also Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 830 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (requiring county to comply with one-person, one-vote by redistricting or by using
weighted voting).
81. 298 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1973).
82. Id. at 73.
83. See id. at 70, 72 (noting that preserving town boundaries facilitates local taxing and
the delivery of local services and that merging these units into equal-population districts
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Supreme Court declined review of this decision for want of a federal question. 84 This
dismissal has been treated as a decision on the merits. That is to say that by deciding
that weighted voting did not raise a federal question, the Supreme Court also decided
that weighted voting does not violate the federal Equal Protection Clause. 85
C. Weighted Voting as a Mathematical Tool
Although both multimember and weighted-voting districts are designed to preserve representation for political units, multimember systems frequently produce unconstitutional deviations or require the formation of unreasonably large legislatures.86 Indeed, from a mathematic perspective, multimember systems are quite
clunky. To allocate a whole number of representatives to each district in a multimember system, the number must be rounded up or down. In Abate v. Mundt, the Supreme
Court explained that “this need to round off ‘fractional representatives’ produces
some variations among districts in terms of population per legislator.” 87 In a county
districting plan where the smallest district has 100 residents, for example, a town
with 151 residents would be allocated two representatives, while a town with 149
residents would have only one.88 Although the population of these two towns is
nearly identical, the first receives twice as much legislative representation as the second.89
In addition, multimember districts may cause the legislature to become unreasonably large. If a district with 100 residents elects one representative, then a district
with 1000 residents would have ten representatives, and a district with 2000 residents
would have twenty.90 Under a multimember districting plan considered by New York
in the 1960s, the state assembly would have contained nearly 400 members. 91 A hypothetical regional government for Boston would have contained over 4000.92 There
is an inherent tension between keeping the legislature small and keeping the deviation within constitutional limits.
Weighted voting eliminates both concerns. First, weighted-voting plans constrain
the overall size of the legislature by limiting the number of representatives each

“would be to sacrifice practicality for an abstraction”).
84. Franklin v. Krause, 415 U.S. 904 (1974).
85. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 247–48
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that “[t]his type of dismissal is deemed to reach the merits of the
case, and creates binding precedent”).
86. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1846–47.
87. 403 U.S. 182, 184 (1971).
88. Id.
89. Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting
that “the voters of the second town would elect half as many county legislators as the nearly
identical number of voters of the third town while simultaneously having one-third less voting
power than the voters in the first town”).
90. Id.
91. See Banzhaf, supra note 30, at 322 n.21.
92. Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1801 (2002).
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district elects.93 In addition, because votes are allocated in proportion to population,
weighted-voting plans generally do not deviate from population equality. In a
weighted-voting plan, the deviation is calculated by comparing the “percent of total
population represented by a given local official to the percent of weighted votes allocated to that official.”94 If one town contains fifteen percent of the county population and is allocated fifteen percent of the total number of votes, there is zero percent
deviation from population equality. Similarly, a town containing 15.8% of the population can be allocated precisely 15.8% of the total number of votes, again producing zero percent deviation. Weighted voting consistently eliminates the deviation
from population equality by granting each district a percentage of the votes that corresponds precisely to its percentage of the population.
D. Weighted Voting and Political Representation
Weighted voting equalizes the mathematic weight of each vote by increasing the
number of votes each district receives in proportion to its population. Although this
is a distinct advantage for equalizing the numeric weight of each vote, it generates
distinct inequality in other dimensions of legislative representation. 95 In particular,
this Section notes that weighted voting generates inequality in functional representation and legislator power, and increases the risk of minority vote dilution.
1. Functional Representation
Weighted voting systems do not provide each person with equal functional representation.96 Weighted voting compensates for population disparities between districts by increasing the number of votes each legislator casts. Yet, this adjustment
accounts for only one dimension of legislative representation. Indeed, legislators do
more than simply vote. They engage in policy making, serve on legislative committees, participate in floor debates and provide a range of constituent services. In contrast to the number of votes, the functional dimensions of legislative representation
cannot be weighted. Thus, “[a] single legislator with a double vote cannot perform
double the legislative functions, serve on double the number of committees, or maintain double the contact with her constituents.” 97 Limiting each district to a single

93. See, e.g., Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d
Cir. 1996) (noting that “the Board’s small size allows for the efficient conduct of county business and a greater degree of flexibility than would a Board of substantially greater size”).
94. Roxbury Taxpayers All., 80 F.3d at 49 (citing League of Women Voters v. Nassau
Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 1984)); Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1848.
95. Ostrow, supra note 5, 1865.
96. Id. at 1862–64.
97. Id.; see also Briffault, supra note 12, at 408 (“A legislator from a large district may
be given proportionately more votes than a legislator from a small district, but she cannot
engage in proportionately more activities, devote herself to the negotiation of proportionately
more bills, or be in proportionately more places at the same time.”); Frug, supra note 92, at
1803 (“[T]he presence of people in the room—and not just their voting power—has an effect
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physical representative can produce constitutionally significant inequality in legislative representation.98
2. Voting Power
Critics of weighted voting, notably Professor John Banzhaf, have argued that
weighted voting does not equalize each legislator’s voting power, or the mathematic
probability determining legislative outcomes.99 Banzhaf demonstrated that weighted
voting tends to over-represent more populous districts by granting their legislators
voting power in excess of their population.100 So, for example, a legislator with sixty
percent of the total number of votes will have 100% of the voting power. Although
the legislator represents only sixty percent of the total number of people, he or she
will have the power to determine the outcome of every decision that comes before
the legislative body.101 The representatives of the remaining forty percent of the population have no power. Banzhaf argued that votes should be allocated so that each
legislator has the power to determine the outcome of as many legislative matters as
they would have been able to determine in a legislature composed of equal-population districts.102 The Supreme Court, however, has rejected this argument,103 interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to require equally weighted, not equally powerful, votes.104

on the outcome. . . . Adding more people from the more populous towns would change the
dynamic of the discussion.”).
98. See infra Part III.A.
99. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1868–70.
100. Banzhaf, supra note 30, at 318 (arguing that “weighted voting does not allocate voting
power among legislators in proportion to the population each represents because voting power
is not proportional to the number of votes a legislator may cast” (emphasis in original)); see
also John F. Banzhaf III, Multimember Electoral Districts—Do They Violate the “One Man,
One Vote” Principle?, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1310 (1966) (providing a mathematical method for
measuring voting power disparities in multimember districts); John F. Banzhaf III, One Man,
? Votes: Mathematical Analysis of Voting Power and Effective Representation, 36 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 808, 809 (1968) (arguing that disparities in legislative voting power impact legislative
representation).
101. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967) (recognizing that a representative of sixty percent of the votes possesses 100% of the power).
102. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1868–70 (describing Banzhaf’s argument and Banzhaf-based
weighted-voting plans); see also DAN. S. FELSENTHAL & MOSHE MACHOVER, THE
MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PARADOXES 82–
83, 142, 160 (1998) (explaining Banzhaf’s formula and noting its use in the U.S. Electoral
College and the European Union).
103. Bd. of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698 (1989) (criticizing Banzhaf’s
voting power formula as merely a “theoretical explanation of each board member’s power to
affect the outcome of board actions” and rejecting it as a measure of the plan’s deviation from
population); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 147, 168–69 (rejecting mathematical theory).
104. Fishkin, supra note 30, at 1893–99 (explaining voting power theory and noting that
the Supreme Court has rejected this approach); Jurij Toplak, Equal Voting Weight of All:
Finally “One Person, One Vote” from Hawaii to Maine?, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 123, 153 (2008)
(arguing that the Court’s decisions reflect its commitment to protecting an equally weighted
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3. Minority Representation
Weighted voting systems have the potential to suppress electoral minorities. 105 In
a weighted voting system, each representative is elected at-large, from the district as
a whole. When representatives are elected at-large, the majority has the capacity to
elect all of the districts representatives.106 Indeed, the Court’s primary concern with
regard to multimember districting is not numeric vote dilution, but rather qualitative
vote dilution resulting from the discriminatory impact on racial minorities. 107 The
Supreme Court, thus, prefers equal-population districts in court-ordered legislative
reapportionment plans “unless the court can articulate a singular combination of
unique factors that justifies a different result.” 108
Weighted voting magnifies the risk of minority vote dilution in two ways. First,
in a multimember district it is possible, particularly using cumulative voting or other
alternative voting mechanisms, for a minority group to win one or two seats. 109 In
contrast, where the district elects a single representative, the majority will always
win. Moreover, in multimember districts, the individual representatives may disagree
with each other and cast conflicting votes.110 In a weighted-voting district, however,
the single representative casts all her votes in a bloc, completely suppressing racial
and political minorities within the weighted-voting district.
At-large systems will be struck down under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act if
the court determines that it has a discriminatory impact on a geographically concentrated racial minority group.111 Still, at-large elections are quite common in local

vote, not an equally powerful one).
105. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1872–73.
106. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47–48 (1986) (“The theoretical basis for this type
of impairment is that where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of
minority voters.”).
107. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 145 (1971) (commenting that multimember districts are typically challenged because of their discriminatory impact, rather than because they
fail to equalize the mathematic weight of each vote); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of
Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 731 n.21 (1964) (approving the use of multimember systems to preserve
representation for counties on the state legislature, but recognizing that “certain aspects of
electing legislators at large from a county as a whole” might make it undesirable); see also
Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1862 (distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative vote dilution claims).
108. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); see also Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S.
690, 692 (1971) (noting the Court’s preference for single-member districts).
109. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1875.
110. Id.; see also Frug, supra note 92, at 1803 (noting that “electing multiple representatives would allow cities to have legislators who disagree with each other”).
111. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (amended 1982). Under
the Thornburg v. Gingles test, a minority group that contends an apportionment plan violates
its constitutional rights must demonstrate as follows: (1) it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member legislative district, (2) it
is politically cohesive, and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable the majority
to usually defeat the preferred candidate of the minority. 478 U.S. at 35.
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elections. According to the National League of Cities, nearly two-thirds of all municipalities use at-large elections in some way.112 In New York, at-large elections are
used to elect all board members in towns, villages, and school districts, and in about
a quarter of the cities.113 Particularly at the local level, the potential for weighted
voting to result in minority vote dilution does not preclude its use.
II. FEDERAL VOTING RIGHTS AND LOCAL POLITICAL INNOVATION
Local governments have long been at the forefront of political innovation, experimenting with political institutions in ways that are inconceivable (and often unconstitutional) at the state or federal level.114 Local governments have devised a baffling
array of limited purpose districts and funding mechanisms to enable the provision of
specialized public services to discrete subsets of the local population. 115 They have
sought to increase their own democratic accountability and responsiveness by introducing alternative voting systems, direct democracy, term limits, campaign finance
reform, and ethics codes to municipal governance.116

112. Municipal Elections, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-andnetworks/resources/cities-101/city-officials/municipal-elections
[https://perma.cc/6B459VVD]; see also Paul H. Edelman, Making Votes Count in Local Elections: A Mathematical
Appraisal of at-Large Representation, 4 ELECTION L.J. 258, 260 (2005); Kenneth A. Stahl,
The Artifice of Local Growth Politics: At-Large Elections, Ballot-Box Zoning, and Judicial
Review, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010).
113. Gerald Benjamin, At-Large Elections in N.Y.S. Cities, Towns, Villages, and School
Districts and the Challenge of Growing Population Diversity, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 733, 736–
41 (2012). Professor Benjamin’s study found that at-large districting in local elections in New
York has not reduced representation for African Americans. The study found that regardless
of the districting system used, African American representatives have been elected in numbers
proportionate to the size of the local African American population. Id. at 734–35. Benjamin
notes that the same cannot be said for Hispanic populations and more recently immigrated
groups. Id. at 735.
114. Briffault, supra note 12, at 348–49 (noting that “local governments do not abide by
the tripartite separation of powers characteristic of the federal and state governments”);
Douglas, supra note 16, at 31–32 (comparing municipalities to “‘test tubes of democracy’ that
can try out novel democratic rules, such as broadening the right to vote, on a smaller scale”);
cf. Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 638 (2017) (analyzing the potential costs and benefits of sub-federal policy experimentation).
115. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Emerging Counties? Prospects for Regional Governance in
the Wake of Municipal Dissolution, 122 YALE L.J.F. 187, 191–92 (2013), http://yalelawjournal
.org/forum/emerging-counties-prospects-for-regional-governance-in-the-wake-of-municipaldissolution [https://perma.cc/UZZ3-AY49] (describing growth of special-purpose districts);
see also RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 13–16 (8th ed. 2016) (describing growth and function of specialpurpose districts).
116. Briffault, supra note 16, at 2–4 (reviewing local political innovations that enhance
democratic accountability).
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In contrast to the state or federal governments, local governments are easily accessible and highly responsive to local preferences and conditions. 117 They continually adapt, in both substance and form, to meet the evolving needs of democratic
governance. Like federalism more generally, local political innovation promotes participatory democracy, increases local tailoring and government responsiveness to citizen concerns, fosters a sense of community, and enables low-risk experimentation
within the federal system.118 Moreover, local experiments can trigger action at higher
levels of government.119 In a common pattern of innovation, “a policy first embraced
by a city proves itself manageable and popular at the local level before percolating
‘out’ to other cities and ‘up’ to the state level.” 120 Thus, policy innovations that succeed at the local level frequently serve as a model for state and national reform. .
In Avery v. Midland County, the Supreme Court extended the one-person, onevote requirement to local legislatures.121 In so doing, the Court recognized that some
political subdivisions are more than mere creatures of the state. As the Court noted,
general-purpose municipal governments, such as towns, cities, and counties, function
as independent democratic governments, regulating autonomously in a wide variety
of areas.122 The Equal Protection Clause, thus, requires them to meet the same standard of democratic accountability as their state and federal counterparts. 123 Equally
critically, however, the Avery Court recognized that many local political institutions
are not equivalent to independent governments, and that in any event, local governments must have the flexibility to adapt to local conditions. 124 The Court, thus, emphasized that the doctrine is not intended to act as a “roadblock[] in the path of innovation, experiment, and development among units of local government.”125

117. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1443 (2012).
118. Id. at 1442 (summarizing the values of experimentation, tailoring, and political participation in local government); see also Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?”
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1315
(1994) (recognizing the virtues of federalism in local governments).
119. BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES
AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 9–13 (2013) (describing local policy innovations that triggered state reform); Paul Diller, Intrastate
Preemption, 87 BOS. U. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (2007) (“City policy experimentation is a catalyst
for change at the state and national levels”); Douglas, supra note 16, at 12, 37 (arguing that
local voting rules “can serve as catalysts for broad-reaching reforms”).
120. Diller, supra note 119, at 1118–19.
121. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
122. Id. at 478.
123. Id.
124. In the words of the Court: “Viable local governments may need many innovations,
numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrangements to
meet changing urban conditions.” Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967); see
also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan.
City, 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1969); Briffault, supra note 16, at 16–17 (noting that local governments
adapt their governance structures in response to local conditions).
125. Avery, 390 U.S. at 485.
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This Part evaluates the application of the one-person, one-vote requirement to local political institutions and argues that the Supreme Court’s flexible approach facilitates local policy innovation that can, in turn, stimulate state and national reform.
Section A reviews the extension of the one-person, one-vote requirement to generalpurpose municipal legislatures. Section B emphasizes the Court’s tolerance for local
political experimentation and tailoring, noting first, that the Court entirely exempts
many local electoral arrangements from the one-person, one-vote requirement, and
second, that the Court has generally upheld innovative apportionment plans designed
by the local government to accommodate local demographics and political preferences.
A. Local Legislatures
The federal courts have traditionally treated local governments as administrative
agents of the state, subject to plenary state control over their formation and power. 126
As Justice Brennan once remarked, “Ours is a ‘dual system of government,’ which
has no place for sovereign cities.”127 In the seminal case of Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, the Supreme Court sustained a state law that permitted consolidation of
two cities without the consent of the smaller of the two.128 Voters in the smaller city
strenuously objected to the consolidation and argued that the state should require that
a majority of each city approve the consolidation. The Supreme Court famously rejected this argument, characterizing local governments as “convenient agencies” created by the state to exercise power on behalf of the state.129 Under Hunter, the state
has “absolute discretion” over the “number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [them] and the territory over which they shall be exercised.”130
The Court reiterated this conception of local governments as agents of the state in
Reynolds v. Sims.131 Alabama’s state senate was composed of one representative
from each county within the state.132 Alabama defended its “one county, one vote”
apportionment plan by arguing that it was modeled on the United States Senate, in
which each state is represented equally.133 The Court, however, rejected the analogy
to Congress. In contrast to the sovereign states, the Court maintained, political subdivisions are not entitled to independent representation on the legislative body. 134 In
the words of the Court: “Political subdivisions of States—counties, cities, or whatever— . . . have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumen-

126. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1857.
127. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982) (citation omitted)
(emphasis omitted).
128. 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (finding that the state may modify or withdraw any powers
necessary to expanding or uniting municipalities).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 337 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
132. Id. at 543–44.
133. Id. at 571–73.
134. Id. at 568.
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talities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.”135 Reynolds thus required that both houses of Alabama’s bicameral state
legislature be apportioned on a population basis. 136
If, as Hunter and Reynolds suggest, local governments are simply administrative
agents of the state, their governing bodies are not democratic “legislatures” and
should not be bound by the one-person, one-vote requirement.137 In Avery v. Midland
County,138 however, the Court embraced a more nuanced view of local governments
recognizing that, in practice, local governments exercise autonomous authority in a
variety of policy areas. 139 In Avery, the Court considered the composition of the
Commissioners Court of Midland County, Texas, which had been districted to enable
a tiny rural minority to elect a majority of its members. 140 The Court noted that the
government at issue performed a number of functions that generally affected the residents of the county, including the imposition of countywide property taxes and the
administration of welfare services.141 Because Midland County functioned independently, the Court held its legislature to the same standards of democratic participation and accountability as state and federal legislatures. 142 Thus, each county resident was entitled to an equally weighted vote.
B. Local Experimentation with Democratic Governance
In Avery v. Midland County, the Supreme Court extended the one-person, onevote requirement to local legislatures. From the outset, however, the Court recognized that a single federal standard could not apply uniformly to the diverse and constantly evolving range of local political arrangements. 143 The Court has, thus, tailored
its application of the one-person, one-vote requirement to accommodate a wide range
of local political conditions, exempting many political units from the one-person,
one-vote requirement, and granting local legislatures substantial discretion to craft
districts that reflect local political preferences.

135. Id. at 575.
136. Id. at 568.
137. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1857; see also Briffault, supra note 12, at 347 (arguing that
under Hunter “a state ought to be able to design local governments along the lines it deems
appropriate to effectuate its purposes”).
138. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
139. Id. at 481 (noting that “the States universally leave much policy and decisionmaking
to their governmental subdivisions”).
140. Avery, 390 U.S. at 476 (noting that the districts contained, “respectively, 67,906; 852;
414; and 828 [people]” and that “[t]his vast imbalance resulted from placing in a single district
virtually the entire city of Midland, Midland County’s only urban center, in which 95% of the
county’s population resides”).
141. Id. at 484.
142. Id. at 481.
143. Id. 483–85.
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1. Special-Purpose Districts and Non-Legislative Bodies
Although Avery extended the one-person, one-vote standard to general-purpose
municipal legislatures, it was careful to note that standard might not apply to “a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents.”144 The Court has since
exempted a variety of special districts and non-legislative bodies from the oneperson, one-vote requirement. In Salyer Land Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District,145 for example, the Court determined that water districts fell within
the “special-purpose district” exception to one person, one vote.146 The Salyer Court
determined that the water storage district had “relatively limited authority” and its
actions “disproportionately affect[ed] landowners.” 147 As a result, the Court held that
the vote could be limited to landowners. In Ball v. James,148 the Court went further,
upholding a “one-acre, one-vote” plan that not only limited the right to vote to landowners, but also distributed votes to each landowner in proportion to the number of
acres he or she owned.149 Courts have upheld similar property-based apportionment
systems for Business Improvement Districts that are created primarily to maximize
the value of real property within the district. 150
In addition, to special-purpose districts, the one-person, one-vote requirement
does not apply to the election of local officials to non-legislative bodies, including
regional and municipal advisory boards,151 local delegations to the state

144. Id. at 483–85; see also Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, 397 U.S. 50,
53, 56 (1970) (recognizing that some local functionaries that are “so far removed from normal
governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups” that they need not
comply).
145. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
146. Id. at 720, 728 (finding one person, one vote does not apply in water district); Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (same).
147. Sayler, 410 U.S. at 728–29.
148. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
149. Id. at 367–68; Briffault, supra note 12, at 360 (describing extension of special-purpose
district exception to water districts with more limited authority); Stahl, supra note 112, at 31
(describing application of doctrine to special-purpose districts).
150. Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 960 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see
also Burris v. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 147, 743 F. Supp. 655, 658 (E.D. Ark. 1990)
(upholding property-based apportionment plan for sewer district), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom, Burris v. City of Little Rock, 941 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1991); Stahl, supra note 112, at
30–31 (application of one person, one vote to business improvement districts).
151. See Educ./Instruccion, Inc. v. Moore, 503 F.2d 1187, 1189 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding
that a regional council is not subject to one person, one vote because the “powers and functions
of the councils are essentially to acquire information, to advise, to comment and to propose,”
none of which constituted governmental functions); Polk Cty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Polk
Commonwealth Charter Comm’n, 522 N.W.2d 783, 788–90 (Iowa 1994) (concluding that the
Mayors’ Commission, which studies and formulates resolutions that are proposed to the
Commonwealth Council, is not subject to the requirement of one person, one vote).
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legislature,152 and representatives to a state constitutional convention.153 Similarly,
the one-person, one-vote requirement does not apply if political officials are
appointed, rather than elected.154
2. Flexibility in Legislative Design
The Supreme Court has adopted a notably flexible approach to reviewing local
legislative plans. The Court has generally cautioned against a rigid focus on population equality noting that “[a]n unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures”
may cause courts to overlook other factors more critical to an “acceptable representation and apportionment arrangement.” 155 The Court has also held that “slightly
greater percentage deviations may be tolerable” at the local level because local legislative bodies have fewer representatives and smaller districts than their state and
federal counterparts.156 As the Second Circuit observed, the Supreme Court’s review
of local apportionment plans is “noteworthy for the nonpromulgation of strict mathematical tests,” so that at the local level the theme “has been flexibility.” 157
In the 1971 case of Abate v. Mundt, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a
multimember apportionment plan for Rockland County, New York, that was designed to preserve representation for towns on a county legislature. 158 Under
Rockland County’s plan, the smallest town was allocated one representative, a town
that was 4.3 times as large was allocated four representatives, and a town that was
4.8 times as large was allocated five representatives.159 As a result of the rounding
process, the plan deviated from population equality by 11.9%. 160 The Court upheld
the plan, despite the deviation, explaining that local needs “may sometimes justify

152. DeJulio v. Georgia, 290 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that one person,
one vote does not apply to local delegations because they do not “engage in governmental
functions”); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1309–12 (M.D.
Ala. 2013), appeal dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 694 (2013) (holding that the one-person, one-vote
requirement does not apply to local delegations); McMillan v. Love, 842 A.2d 790, 799–01
(Md. 2004) (finding county delegation is not subject to the one-person, one-vote requirement
because the delegation only refers and recommends legislation to the Maryland General
Assembly).
153. Driskell v. Edwards, 413 F. Supp. 974, 977–78 (W.D. La. 1976) (concluding that “the
principles of one-man, one-vote had no application to the selection of delegates to the
Louisiana Constitutional Convention”).
154. Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967) (noting one-person, one-vote does
not apply when officials are appointed).
155. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973).
156. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 7, at 146 (“The sheer number and variety of ‘players,’ i.e., office
holders, special interest groups and interested parties, generally is smaller in local redistricting
than at the higher levels.”).
157. League of Women Voters v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155 (2d Cir.
1984).
158. Abate, 403 U.S. at 184–86.
159. Id. at 184 n.1.
160. Id.
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departures from strict equality.”161 In particular, the Court explained that preserving
representation for towns on the county legislature was a legitimate districting priority
because it would facilitate local governance and service delivery.162
The Abate Court recognized that multimember districting plans could produce
large deviations from population equality, but mindful of the “experimental” nature
of Rockland County’s plan, refused to invalidate the plan on that basis. 163 Instead,
the Court facilitated the County’s experimental use of multimember districts to preserve towns as the basic unit of representation on the county legislature.
Similarly, in Dusch v. Davis, the Supreme Court upheld an innovative apportionment plan designed to meet the needs of a city containing rural and urban districts
that varied dramatically in size.164 The City of Virginia Beach contained seven boroughs that ranged in population from 1000 to 30,000. Three boroughs were urban,
three were rural, and one, the Borough of Virginia Beach, was centered around tourism. Under Virginia Beach’s “Seven-Four Plan,” four council members were elected
at large, without regard to residence, and seven were elected at large, with one residing in each of the city’s seven boroughs. 165
Although the districts varied dramatically in size, the Court determined that the
plan satisfied the one-person, one-vote requirement. The Court explained, the plan
“uses boroughs in the city ‘merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for
voting or representation.’”166 The residency requirement assured “that this heterogeneous city will be able to give due consideration to questions presented throughout
the entire area.”167 In addition, the Court suggested that the plan could serve as a
model to balance competing interests in other similarly situated cities, noting that:
“The Seven-Four Plan seems to reflect a detente between urban and rural communities that may be important in resolving the complex problems of the modern megalopolis in relation to the city, the suburbia, and the rural countryside.” 168
The Supreme Court has also upheld local efforts to expand the relevant political
community by extending the franchise to include nonresident property owners. 169 In

161. Id. at 185.
162. Id.; see also Schneider v. Rockefeller, 293 N.E.2d 67, 71 n.3 (N.Y. 1972) (noting that
flexibility may be “desirable to facilitate intergovernmental co-operation”).
163. Abate, 403 U.S. at 186 n.3 (“[W]e express no opinion on the contention that, in future
years, the Rockland County plan may produce substantially greater deviations than presently
exist. Such questions can be answered if and when they arise.”).
164. 387 U.S. 112, 117 (1967); see also Dallas Cty. v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 477 (1975)
(upholding county legislative system that provides for countywide balloting for each of the
four commission members, but requires that a member be elected from each of four residency
districts); Carlson v. San Juan Cty., 333 P.3d 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (finding county residency requirement did not violate Equal Protection Clause).
165. Dusch, 387 U.S. at 115.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 116.
168. Id. at 117.
169. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Dual Resident Voting: Traditional Disenfranchisement
and Prospects for Change, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1954, 1965 (2002) (describing expansion of
franchise in local elections to nonresident property owners).
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Spahos v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, one of the earliest cases dealing with nonresident enfranchisement, the Supreme Court upheld a voting scheme for a seaside resort
town that extended the franchise to nonresidents who owned property in the town. 170
The Supreme Court rejected the claim that expanding the franchise to include
nonresidents unconstitutionally dilutes the vote of permanent residents. The Court
determined that it was rational to include nonresident property owners, many of
whom were summer residents, in the community’s political process.171 Thus, despite
the extension of the one-person, one-vote requirement to local legislatures, “local
governments still have the flexibility to organize themselves in ways that meet the
needs of the local communities”172 and the potential to stimulate state and national
reform.
III. LOCAL INNOVATIONS IN LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
For the past several decades, New York’s counties have experimented with
weighted voting, developing innovative apportionment plans that use weighed voting
to preserve representation for political subdivisions on the county legislature.
Traditionally, counties in New York were governed by a Board of Supervisors made
up of the elected supervisor of each town within the county.173 In the aftermath of
the one-person, one-vote cases, several counties preserved their Boards of
Supervisors by allocating votes to each town supervisor in proportion to the town’s
population. The Second Circuit has upheld this model, noting its value in preserving
“traditional boundaries and local allegiances.”174 Still, allocating one representative
to districts that vary substantially in population could produce significant inequality
in legislative representation.
As this Part explains, counties have responded to this demographic challenge in
different ways, with different results. Some counties equalize legislative representation by incorporating weighted-voting into multimember or equal-population plans.
Weighted-equal-population plans use roughly equal-population districts, each of
which elects its own representative to the legislature. Weighted-multimember plans
increase the number of representatives each district elects in proportion to its popu-

170. 207 F. Supp. 688, 692 (S.D. Ga. 1962), aff’d, 371 U.S. 206, 206 (1962). Though this
case was decided in 1962, before the major one-person, one-vote cases, courts have continued
to rely on its holding to permit the enfranchisement of nonresident property owners in a variety
of local elections. See, e.g., May v. Town of Mountain Vill., 132 F.3d 576, 580–81 (10th Cir.
1997); Collins v. Town of Goshen, 635 F.2d 954, 958 (2d Cir. 1980); Brown v. Bd of
Comm’rs, 722 F. Supp. 380, 398 (E.D. Tenn. 1989.)
171. Spahos, 207 F. Supp. at 692; see also Diebler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d
328, 339 (3d Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J., concurring) (describing “[t]he city’s commendable effort
to enfranchise nonresidents and to insure nonresidents’ participation in the leadership of the
City”).
172. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 251
(N.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 80 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1996)).
173. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1850–51.
174. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996).
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lation. Hybrid-weighted-voting plans do not produce significant inequality in legislative representation because each legislator represents roughly the same number of
people and casts roughly the same number of votes. In 2017, a federal district court
approved of a countywide hybrid-weighted-voting plan, finding that the plan
satisfied the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement and provided each citizen
with fair and effective legislative representation.175
Other counties were less concerned with disparities in legislative representation,
and more concerned with disparities in voting power. These counties sought to equalize each legislator’s voting power by apportioning votes so that each legislator would
be able to determine the outcome of as many legislative decisions as he or she would
be able to determine if the votes were not weighted. 176 Though the New York courts
initially required counties to use the voting power model,177 the federal courts have
since rejected this approach,178 leaving the status of voting power plans unsettled.
A. One Town, One Representative
In a pair of cases decided in the late 1990s, the Second Circuit upheld two traditional countywide weighted-voting plans, under which towns with varying populations were each represented by a single representative on the board. In 1996, in
Roxbury Taxpayers Alliance v. Delaware County Board of Supervisors,179 the
Second Circuit upheld Delaware County’s “one town, one representative” weightedvoting plan against an Equal Protection challenge.180 At the time of the case,
Delaware County was made up of nineteen towns that ranged in population from 550
to 6600.181 Each town was represented by its elected Town Supervisor, whose vote

175. Westcott v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16-CV-1088 (GTS/CFH), 2017
WL 1532588, at *12–13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2017).
176. Roxbury Taxpayers All., 886 F. Supp. at 248 n.10 (“In the simple arithmetic model,
the number of actual votes are distributed in proportion to the percentage of the total district
population in each unit. In a Banzhaf-based model, the weighted votes are apportioned to each
representative based on the theoretical voting power each representative should possess.”).
177. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967).
178. Jackson v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509, 532–34 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(rejecting voting power model); see also Bd. of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698
(1989) (criticizing Banzhaf’s formula as merely a “theoretical explanation of each board member's power to affect the outcome of board actions” and rejecting it as a measure of plan’s
deviation from population); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 147, 168–69 (1971) (rejecting
Professor Banzhaf’s mathematical theory).
179. 80 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996).
180. Id. at 49; see also Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Schoharie Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 975
F. Supp. 191, 194–95 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding a substantially identical weighted-voting
scheme in Schoharie County).
181. 80 F.3d 42, 44. For updated statistics, see Quick Facts: Delaware County, New York,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/delawarecountynewyork [https://
perma.cc/9ESL-TEGU]; Quick Facts: Schoharie County, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/schohariecountynewyork [https://perma.cc/YXG9XW86].
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was weighted in proportion to the town’s population. 182 The smallest town contained
one percent of the total county population and was allocated one percent of the total
number of votes on the board. The largest town contained fourteen percent of the
total county population and was allocated fourteen percent of the total number of
votes on the board.183
The court calculated the plan’s maximum deviation from population equality using a weighted-vote formula that compared the percent of population an official represents to the percent of votes allocated to that official. 184 Because votes on the board
were allocated in proportion to the population of each district, the plan deviated by
less than one percent from population equality. The court thus concluded that
Delaware County’s plan complied with the quantitative one-person, one-vote, requirement.185
In addition, the Second Circuit expressly rejected the claim that the Equal
Protection Clause requires the use of equal-population districts.186 Though the population of each town varied, the Second Circuit found there was nothing in the record
to indicate that the plan did not provide “fair and effective” representation.187 To the
contrary, the court explained that the county’s “one town, one representative” structure “assures that the interests of every town, no matter how small, are considered by
the Board, and that no town suffers from permanent lack of representation on account
of its size.”188
In Reform of Schoharie County v. Schoharie County Board of Supervisors,189
which followed only two years later, the court went further, expressly rejecting the
claim that Schoharie’s “one town, one representative” plan violates the Equal
Protection rights of residents of larger districts, who receive less functional representation than residents of smaller districts.190 Although the towns in Schoharie County
varied in size,191 the court determined that there was no qualitative difference in the

182. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d. Cir. 1996)
(noting that the plan “allocates votes among Board members based strictly on the population
represented by each Supervisor”).
183. Id. at 45.
184. Id. at 49 (citing League of Women Voters v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d
155, 170 (2d Cir. 1984)) (comparing the “percent of total population represented by a given
local official to the percent of weighted votes allocated to that official”).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 45 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause required equal-population districts
and that “the County’s desire to preserve the integrity of town boundaries could not override
that constitutional requirement”).
187. Id. at 46 (quoting Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F.
Supp. 242, 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 80 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996)).
188. Id. at 49.
189. 975 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, No. 97-9297, 1998 WL 425911 (2d.
Cir. Apr. 22, 1998).
190. Id.
191. The towns varied in size from 332 to 7270 residents. This number includes students
from S.U.N.Y. Cobleskill. Id. at 192. The court later states that the population of the largest
town is 5670, which presumably does not include those S.U.N.Y. students. Id. at 193 n.1.
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voters’ access to their elected representative, or in any of the other non-voting functions, such as participation in committees, legislative debate, or discussion with other
supervisors.192 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
that local supervisors are likely to be able to provide “fair and effective representation” despite the fact that the towns differ in size. 193
Similarly, in its seminal case upholding weighted voting, the New York Court of
Appeals rejected the claim that inequality in legislative representation violates the
Equal Protection Clause.194 In Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors of Washington
County, New York’s highest court recognized that weighted voting discriminates
against residents of smaller districts because “representatives who cast the larger aggregates of votes can be expected to have greater influence with their colleagues”195
and “necessarily have greater influence over the passage of legislation.” 196 The court
held, however, that there is “nothing unconstitutional in a disparity of influence”
among the representatives.197
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Evenwel v. Abbott198 lends additional
support to the claim that Equal Protection does not require that each legislator represent an equal number of people.199 In Evenwel, the Court expressly noted that “constituents have no constitutional right to equal access to their elected representatives.”200 The Court explained that it was reasonable to create districts that equalize
the total number of people (as opposed to total number of eligible voters) because
such districts promote “equitable and effective representation,” “[b]y ensuring that
each representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same number of
constituents.”201 Yet, the Court did not require that districts contain an equal number
of people. Under Evenwel, equalizing the number of constituents each legislator
represents is a reasonable state policy, not a federal constitutional mandate.
B. Hybrid Weighted-Voting Plans
In Reform of Schoharie County v. Schoharie County Board of Supervisors, the
district court upheld the county’s one-town, one-representative plan, but emphasized

192. Although the court noted that the argument might be more persuasive in a densely
populated county. Id. at 196.
193. Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 97-9297, 1998 WL
425911, at *1 (2d. Cir. Apr. 22, 1998) (“We affirm substantially for the reasons stated in [the
district court opinion]. The arguments made by appellant in the present case are not substantially different from those made, and rejected, in the similar suit brought with regard to the
board of supervisors of Schoharie’s neighboring county, Delaware County.”).
194. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 229 N.E.2d 195, 197–200 (N.Y. 1967).
195. Id.
196. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 279 N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (App. Div.),
aff’d, 229 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1967).
197. Iannucci, 229 N.E.2d at 199.
198. 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).
199. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1865–66.
200. Id. at 1132 n.14.
201. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).
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the uniformly rural character of the county. 202 The district court noted that weighted
voting at higher levels of government, or in more densely populated counties, could
“lead to serious non-voting-related constitutional problems.”203 Some counties mitigate these problems by combining weighted-voting with multimember or equal-population districts. These plans equalize legislative representation because each legislator represents roughly the same number of people and casts roughly the same
number of votes.
1. Weighted-Multimember Districts
Some counties use weighted voting to preserve multimember districts that would
otherwise generate impermissibly high deviations from population equality or require the formation of an unreasonably large legislative body. Rockland County, for
example, used weighted voting to reduce the deviation produced by its multimember
apportionment plan.204 Rockland County used its five existing towns as electoral districts.205 Under the plan, each town was allocated a number of representatives in proportion to the town’s population.206 At the time of its formation, the plan deviated
from population equality by 11.9%.207 In its 1971 decision in Abate v. Mundt the
Supreme Court found that the deviation was justified by the county’s desire to preserve representation for its towns. 208 Although the Court recognized that in future
years, the county’s multimember districting plan “may produce substantially greater
deviations than presently exist,” it determined that “such questions can be answered
if and when they arise.”209
By 1998, however, the deviation caused by Rockland County’s multimember plan
had increased to 19.8%.210 The court determined that the increased deviation could
no longer be justified and ordered Rockland County to reapportion its legislature to
comply with the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement. To reduce the deviation below the presumptively constitutional ten percent threshold, the County would
have had to increase the size of its legislature to forty-two members, an increase that
would have defeated the county’s goal of maintaining an efficient legislative body.211
Instead, Rockland County preserved representation for its towns by incorporating
weighted voting into its multimember apportionment plan. Under the county’s hybrid
weighted-multimember plan, each town was allocated a total number of votes in pro-

202. 975 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
203. Id. at 194–95.
204. ROCKLAND CTY. CODE § 101-8 (1997).
205. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
206. Id. at 184–86.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Schneider v. Rockefeller, 31 N.Y.S.2d 420, 429 n.3 (1972) (noting that
flexibility may be “desirable to facilitate intergovernmental co-operation”).
209. Abate, 403 U.S. at 186 n.3.
210. Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
211. Id.
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portion to its population. The town’s votes were then divided among the town’s representatives.212 So, for example, if the largest town contained twenty percent of the
total population, it would be allocated twenty percent of the total number of votes.
Those votes would then be divided among the town’s representatives who are elected
at large from the town as a whole.
Rockland County’s hybrid weighted-voting reflected its desire to use its towns as
multimember districts and its need to reduce the plan’s total deviation from population equality. Although Rockland County later replaced its hybrid-weighted-multimember system with a county legislature composed of equal-population districts, its
innovative apportionment plan continues to serve as a model for reapportionment
reform.213 In 2010, for example, Schenectady County adopted this model to preserve
its multimember apportionment plan. Schenectady County is governed by a county
legislature made up of four multimember districts whose boundaries correspond to
existing city and town boundaries.214 The city of Schenectady is divided into two
districts and each of the other districts contains two whole towns.215 The number of
members each district elected was adjusted after each census to reflect changes in
the population.216
At the time of its adoption, the county legislature contained fourteen members. 217
After several decades of minor fluctuation, the 2010 census revealed significant demographic shifts.218 To comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement, the
county would have had to add nine more members to the board.219 Voters objected
to an expansion of this size. In the words of one voter:
[A] Legislature of 24 members would work, provided we raise enough
in additional county taxes to pay for nine new legislators and their desks
and crowd all of this into the legislative chamber. But would even the
League of Women Voters claim that this is a reasonable solution? I doubt
it.220

212. ROCKLAND CTY. CODE § 101-8 (1997).
213. Memorandum from Christopher H. Gardner, County Attorney, Schenectady, on
Results of the 2010 Census and the Requirements of Section 2.04 of the Charter of
Schenectady County, and the Requirements of the Federal and State Court Decisions
Requiring One Person/One Vote to the Schenectady County Legislature (Apr. 8, 2011) (on
file with the Indiana Law Journal) [hereinafter Memorandum from Christopher H. Gardner];
see also Lamendola, supra note 24.
214. Memorandum from Christopher H. Gardner, supra note 213, at 3.
215. Id. at 2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1 (noting that for the first time since 1970, Schenectady County’s population
increased rather than decreased).
219. Id. at 3. The County Charter limited the population deviation above or below the average population per legislator to 7.5%. SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y., CHARTER § 2.04(f) (2001),
amended by SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y., CHARTER § 2.04 (2011).
220. Edwin D. Reilly Jr., Opinion, Weighted Voting Is Probably Least Bad Solution, DAILY
GAZETTE (May 22, 2011), https://dailygazette.com/article/2011/05/22/0522_reilly [https://
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At the same time, the county wanted to maintain its fixed electoral districts, first
to preserve the integrity of its political subdivisions,221 and second, to avoid the “potential mischief of single member districts which could encourage gerrymandering.”222
Rather than dramatically expand the size of its legislature, or even more dramatically, replace its multimember districts with equal-population districts, the county
used weighted voting to reduce the plan’s deviation from population equality. 223
Under the County’s hybrid multimember-weighted voting plan, each district received
a total number of votes in proportion to its population. The votes were divided among
the district’s representatives who were elected at large. Weighted voting enabled the
county to achieve multiple goals, including: (i) maintaining its fixed multimember
districts, which preserved representation for its political subdivisions and prevented
gerrymandering, and (ii) reducing its deviation from population equality without expanding the size of its legislature.
2. Weighted-Equal-Population Districts
Cortland County uses weighted voting to preserve single-member districts that
correspond to fixed political subdivisions and contain roughly the same number of
people, but would not otherwise satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement. At the time of its formation, Cortland County’s legislature was composed
of nineteen single-member districts that corresponded to fixed political subdivisions
and ranged in population from 2100 to 2700 residents. 224 These roughly-equal-population districts were formed by subdividing the city of Cortland and three more populous suburban towns into legislative districts, and by grouping together rural towns
with smaller populations.225 If each single-member district was granted a single vote,
the plan would deviate from population equality by more than twenty-five percent.226
Instead, the County used weighted voting to eliminate the deviation and equalize the
numeric weight of each vote.
The County’s hybrid-weighted-equal-population plan allocated legislative votes
to each district in proportion to its population. The smallest district contained 4.5%
of the population and was granted 4.5% of the votes.227 The largest district contained

perma.cc/D66F-M2P9].
221. Id.
222. Memorandum from Christopher H. Gardner, supra note 213, at 3–4 (noting that maintaining the connection between districts and political subdivisions “(i) [P]reserves the natural
and historical political units in the county, (ii) recognized that citizens identify with the cities
and towns through schools, PTA and other civic organizations, and (iii) further recognizes that
such an identification of the votes with political units would be lost if a system of equal population districts splits some communities and artificially created others.”).
223. Id.
224. Slater v. Bd. of Supervisors of Cortland, 330 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948–50 (Sup. Ct. 1972),
aff’d, 346 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1973).
225. Id.
226. Slater, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
227. Id.
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twenty-five percent of the population and was granted twenty-five percent of the
votes.228 Because each district received a percentage of the total number of votes that
corresponded to its percentage of the total county population, there was no deviation
from population equality. In addition, because each legislator represented roughly
the same number of people, there was no significant deviation in functional representation. There is also less of a risk that a geographically concentrated minority
group will be submerged within a larger weighted-voting district.
Cortland County’s weighted-equal-population plan combines the advantages of
equal-population districting with weighted voting. As the New York court observed
in upholding the constitutionality of Cortland’s plan:
It unites the smaller towns possessing similarity of interests into legislative districts; it divides the two larger towns into legislative districts.
The city’s boundary is not pierced. It creates legislative districts much
closer in population than if weighted voting were used on the basis of
existing towns and city wards in which populations vary from 493 to
7469.229
Voters in Cortland continue to approve of this approach. Following the 2010 census, Cortland County considered several possible redistricting plans, one of which
would have eliminated weighted voting.230 In 2012, the voters passed a referendum
to maintain their weighted-equal-population system.231
3. Multidimensional Districts
Warren County uses weighted voting together with multimember and singlemember districts to preserve the integrity of political subdivision boundaries. Warren
County’s weighted-apportionment plan vividly illustrates the versatility of weighted
voting as a means of complying with the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement. Warren County is comprised of eleven towns and one city that vary widely in
population.232 The largest town contains forty-two percent of the county population,
while the smallest, contains only one percent of the county population.233 If each
district elected one representative, whose vote was weighted in proportion to the district’s population, there would be significant inequality in legislative representation.
The legislator with forty-two percent of the total number of votes would dominate

228. Id.
229. Slater, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
230. Catherine Wilde, Smaller Legislature on Tuesday’s Ballot, CORTLAND STANDARD
(Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.cortlandstandard.net/articles/11012012n.html [https://perma.cc
/PEB2-9D26].
231. See CORTLAND CTY., N.Y., RULES OF ORDER art. XI (2014); Legislative and Election
http://www.cortland-co.org/election/LEGISLATIVE
Districts,
CORTLAND COUNTY,
%20DISTRICTS%2022%20X%2036.pdf.
232. Westcott v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16-CV-1088 (GTS/CFH), 2017
WL 1532588, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2017).
233. Id. at *5–7 (describing the county’s weighted-voting plan).
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the legislative agenda, but have little contact with individual voters and less time to
serve on committees and perform non-voting functions. The legislator with only one
percent of the vote would have significant contact with individual voters, but powerless to determine the outcome of any legislative matters.
To prevent those problems, Warren County equalizes legislative representation
in two ways. First, the largest town is a multimember district which elects five representatives to the county board.234 The town is allocated forty-two percent of the
total number of votes, which are divided among the town’s five representatives. Each
representative, therefore, represents approximately eight percent of the population
and casts eight percent of the votes.235 Second, the next largest municipality, the city
of Glens Falls, contains 22.5% of the county population. 236 The city is subdivided
into five wards, each containing approximately 4.5% of the population. Each district
elects a single representative who casts 4.5% of the votes on the board.237 The balance
of the towns range from 1.1-6.2% of the population. Each town elects one
representative whose vote is weighted in proportion to the town’s population. 238
In Westcott v. Warren County Board of Supervisors, the district court upheld
Warren County’s hybrid weighted-voting plan, finding that it satisfied the
quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement and provided each citizen with fair
and effective representation.239 Warren County’s plan equalizes the numeric weight
of each person’s vote by allocating legislative votes to each district in proportion to
its population. It equalizes other dimensions of legislative representation by assuring
that each legislator represents roughly the same percentage of the population. It also
maintains fixed electoral districts that preserve representation for political
subdivisions and prevent gerrymandering. Warren County’s apportionment plan
demonstrates that weighted voting can be used to create a legislature that reflects a
more nuanced balance of political values than a legislature composed of singlemember, equal-population districts.
C. Voting Power Plans
Warren County’s hybrid weighted-voting plan combines weighted voting with
multimember and single-member districts to equalize the number of constituents

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Westcott v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16-CV-1088 (GTS/CFH), 2017
WL 1532588, at *12–13 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2017); see also Don Lehman, Lawsuit May
Renew Debate over Board of Supervisors or Legislature in Warren County, POST STAR (Apr.
24, 2016), http://poststar.com/news/local/lawsuit-may-renew-debate-over-board-of-supervisorsor-legislature/article_1e589aca-47c3-5fa0-8075-9f83a01caf34.html [https://perma.cc/C5QN8GLB]; Don Lehman, Official Outlines County Board Format Options, POST STAR (Mar. 23,
2016), http://poststar.com/news/local/official-outlines-county-board-format-options/article_6
df49540-c4fa-51d9-a33b-dd6cd68018bc.html [https://perma.cc/ZM6W-FUCB].
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each legislator represents and the number of votes each legislator casts. Other counties have addressed a similar demographic challenge in a very different way, with
very different results. Nassau County, for example, used a voting-power plan to preserve representation for the Town of Hempstead, which contained more than half of
the total county population. 240 In 1993, however, a federal district court rejected
Nassau’s voting power model and ordered it to reapportion its legislature to equalize
the numeric weight of each person’s vote. The County responded by replacing its
Board of Supervisors with a county legislature composed of equal-population districts.241
Today, Nassau County’s equal-population apportionment plan suffers from the
same crisis in partisan gerrymandering as equal-population apportionment plans
throughout the country. Indeed in 2014, a non-partisan coalition of voting rights
groups organized a “‘Gerrymandering Grand Prix,’ a guided caravan tour of the zany
borders of gerrymandered Nassau County Legislature districts.” 242 The director observed that, “gerrymandering hurts our democracy by dividing communities, entrenching incumbents, and discouraging political competition and participation.”243
Perhaps this result could have been avoided if Nassau County modified, rather than
replaced, its weighted-voting plan.
1. Equally-Powerful Votes
Nassau County’s weighted-voting plan long preceded the one-person, one-vote
requirement. Like other New York counties, Nassau’s Board of Supervisors was initially composed of the elected Supervisor of each of its component towns.244 In
1917, however, the county adopted a weighted-voting plan to increase representation
for its largest town, the Town of Hempstead.245 Under Nassau County’s weightedvoting plan, two cities and two towns each had one member on the Board of
Supervisors, while Hempstead had two members. 246 The total number of votes on the
Board were allocated to each district in proportion to its population.247 To prevent

240. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 44–45 (1965).
241. See infra notes 260–261.
242. Gerrymandering Grand Prix, NASSAU COUNTY UNITED REDISTRICTING COALITION
http://www.nassauunitedredistricting.org/gerrymandering-grand-prix-2 [https://perma.cc
/RNW6-GAHY]; see also Nassau County Gerrymandering Grand Prix: Redistricting
Reformers Rally To Oppose Partisan Gerrymandering, READMEDIA (Mar. 23, 2014, 1:15 PM),
http://readme.readmedia.com/NASSAU-COUNTY-GERRYMANDERING-GRANDPRIX/8359227 [https://perma.cc/JB32-SCQX].
243. Id.
244. Bernard Grofman & Howard Scarrow, Iannucci and Its Aftermath: The Application
of the Banzhaf Index to Weighted Voting in the State of New York, in GAME THEORY AND THE
U.S. COURTS 170, 178–79 (S. J. Brams et al. eds., 1979).
245. Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 17, at 288–89; Weinstein, supra note 240, at 44.
246. Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 17, at 288–89; Weinstein, supra note 240, at 44.
247. Weinstein, supra note 240, at 44.
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the Town of Hempstead from dominating the Board, the County adopted a supermajority requirement. Hempstead was granted fourteen out of twenty-five votes, but a
majority was defined as fifteen (rather than thirteen) out of twenty-five votes.248
By 1968, when the Supreme Court extended the one-person, one-vote requirement
to general purpose municipal governments, Hempstead contained fifty-seven percent
of the county population, but was allocated only 49.6% of the vote.249 The New York
Court of Appeals determined that this allocation violated the one-person, one-vote
requirement and ordered the county to reapportion its legislature on a population basis.250
Nassau County could not simply weigh the votes of each district in proportion to
its population, because doing so would give the Town of Hempstead nearly sixty
percent of the total number of votes on the Board. The New York Court of Appeals
had already held that such an apportionment plan would not be valid. In Iannucci v.
Board of Supervisors of Washington County, the court observed that:
[A] particular weighted voting plan would be invalid if 60% of the
population were represented by a single legislator who was entitled to
cast 60% of the votes. Although his vote would apparently be weighted
only in proportion to the population he represented, he would actually
possess 100% of the voting power whenever a simple majority was all
that was necessary to enact legislation.251
The court held that weighted voting could be used to satisfy the one-person, onevote requirement so long as votes were distributed so that each “legislator’s voting
power, measured by the mathematical possibility of his casting a decisive vote,” approximates the power he would have in a legislature composed of equal-population
districts.252
Nassau County, thus, complied with the one-person, one-vote requirement using
a voting-power plan that allocated votes in proportion to each legislator’s voting
power, rather than in proportion to each district’s population.253 Under Nassau
County’s plan, Hempstead was allocated enough votes to enable it to determine the
outcome of sixty percent of the Board’s decisions.254 This formula resulted in
Hempstead being allocated slightly less than a majority of the total number of
votes.255 Over the next several decades, both the New York Court of Appeals and the
Second Circuit approved of Nassau County’s weighted-voting plan.256 In Franklin v.

248. See Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 17, at 296.
249. Weinstein, supra note 240, at 44–45.
250. Franklin v. Mandeville, 256 N.E.2d 534, 535 (N.Y. 1970).
251. 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967) (accepting Banzhaf’s voting power argument).
252. Id.; see also Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 17, at 287–92 (describing Iannucci as a
“remarkable decision, standing as one of the most conspicuous examples ever recorded of a
judicial decision based squarely on the findings of scholarly research”).
253. See Weinstein, supra note 240, at 44–45.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See League of Women Voters of Nassau Cty. v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737
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Kraus, for example, the New York Court of Appeals noted that Nassau County’s
plan “comports with the standards set forth in Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors of
Washington County as closely as is possible, given the unique situation created by
Hempstead’s size with the disparities in population among the other [districts].” 257
In its 1989 decision striking down the one-borough, one-vote structure of New
York City’s Board of Estimate, however, the Supreme Court rejected the voting
power formula as a means of calculating a plan’s deviation from population equality.258 Although the case did not involve weighted voting, the decision called the
constitutionality of Nassau County’s voting plan into question. If a voting power
formula could not be used to calculate the deviation from population equality, could
it be used to allocate votes within a weighted-voting plan?
In Jackson v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors, the federal district court said
no.259 Echoing the Supreme Court’s language, the Jackson court criticized the voting
power model both for the “mathematical quagmire such a system engenders,” and,
more importantly, because “the methodology fails to take into account other critical
factors related to the actual daily operations of a governing body.” 260
The demographics of Nassau County thus created a structural problem.
Population-based weighted voting would grant the Town of Hempstead more than a
majority of votes on the Board. Yet, the voting power formula could no longer be
used to adjust the allocation of votes on the Board. The Jackson court concluded that
Nassau County’s weighted voting system was fundamentally flawed and ordered the
county to adopt a reapportionment plan that complied with the one-person, one-vote
requirement. The County eventually replaced its weighted voting system with a
county legislature composed of equal-population districts.261

F.2d 155, 156 (2d Cir. 1984); Franklin v. Krause, 298 N.E.2d 68, 72 (N.Y. 1973).
257. Krause, 298 N.E.2d at 72 (citations omitted); Franklin v. Krause, 415 U.S. 904 (1974)
(declining review for want of a federal question).
258. Bd. of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698 (1989) (criticizing Banzhaf’s
formula as merely a “theoretical explanation of each board member’s power to affect the outcome of board actions” and rejecting it as a measure of the plan’s deviation from population).
259. Jackson v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(“[T]he Court finds that weighted voting as it is presently utilized by the Nassau County Board
of Supervisors is unconstitutional, in that it violates the one person, one vote principle encompassed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.”).
260. Id. at 532.
261. Id. To help formulate the remedial plan, the County Executive appointed a seventeenmember Commission on Government Revision. The Commission proposed, and the board of
supervisors eventually adopted, an apportionment plan composed of nineteen single-member
legislative districts, two of which were minority districts. See Jackson v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 157 F.R.D. 612, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also John T. McQuiston, Plan To
Revamp Nassau Legislature To Create 2 Minority Districts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/28/nyregion/plan-to-revamp-nassau-legislature-to-create2-minority-districts.html [https://perma.cc/5STC-XFM8] (“The creation of two minoritydominated districts is at the heart of a plan for a new 19-member Nassau County Legislature
that is meant to assure fair representation for Long Island’s growing number of minority residents.”).
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2. Did the Experiment End Too Soon?
Although the federal courts reject voting power plans, they have continued to uphold population-based weighted-voting plans that equalize the numeric weight of
each vote by allocating votes to each district in proportion to the district’s population.262 Thus, Nassau County’s experiment with weighted voting leaves at least two
questions unanswered.
First, what is the legal status of New York’s remaining weighted-voting power
plans? The New York Court of Appeals decision requiring counties to adopt voting
power plans has not been overturned. 263 As a result, counties in New York continue
to use these systems. Following the 2010 census, for example, Essex County adjusted
its allocation of votes using the voting power formula.264 In some cases, the distinction may not matter. In practice, the voting power formula often produces an allocation of votes that mirrors the allocation that would be produced if votes were distributed in proportion to population, making it possible to comply with both the federal
and state standard.265 Nonetheless, the system is difficult to understand and expensive
to implement. It is, at best, not necessary, and more likely, not valid.
Second, could Nassau County have preserved its board of supervisors without the
voting power formula by using a hybrid weighted system? Specifically, could Nassau
have either subdivided the Town of Hempstead into roughly equal-population districts, each of which would elect its own representative to the board (as is done in
Cortland County), or treated the Town of Hempstead as a multimember district, increasing its representatives in proportion to its population and splitting the total number of weighted votes between them (as is done in Schenectady County), or created
its own mix of apportionment systems (as is done in Warren County)?
Had Nassau County continued to experiment with weighted voting, it could have
developed a plan that preserved representation for its political units and satisfied the
one-person, one-vote requirement. Instead, like most equal-population apportionment plans, Nassau County’s gerrymandered districts reflect little more than the political self-interest of the politicians who draw them.

262. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1996)
(upholding plan under which each supervisor is allocated a number of votes in proportion to
the population of his or her town); Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Schoharie Cty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 975 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
263. Iannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967).
264. Lohr McKinstry, Slight Power Shift, PRESS REPUBLICAN (Apr. 13, 2012), http://
www.pressrepublican.com/news/local_news/slight-power-shift/article_16140991-dc49-5e84aaa6-cfbda4470f50.html [https://perma.cc/TC69-PWME] (noting that, in Essex County, the
Town of Ticonderoga has 13.39% of the county population and 13.44% of the voting power,
not 13.44% of the actual number of votes).
265. Reform of Schoharie Cty., 975 F. Supp. at 193 n.1 (noting only “minor differences
between the votes allotted by the Banzhaf method . . . and those which would be allotted by
strictly arithmetical computation”); Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 17, at 298 (noting that
except in rare cases with extreme population deviations between districts, the allocation of
votes based upon the Banzhaf-based model deviates only slightly from the strict arithmetic
model).
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IV. USING WEIGHTED VOTING TO END PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
In the United States, state legislatures are primarily responsible for redrawing the
boundaries of state legislative and congressional electoral districts after each decennial census.266 Self-interested districting is an entirely predictable byproduct of this
process. When legislators are empowered to draw their own districts, they will inevitably use that power to secure their own reelection and maximize their party’s representation in the legislature.267 In the decades before the reapportionment revolution, self-interested districting manifested through inaction. State legislatures refused
to adjust electoral district bounds in response to widespread demographic shifts from
rural to urban areas.268 The Supreme Court eventually intervened with its one-person,
one-vote doctrine, requiring that legislatures be apportioned on a population basis so
that every person has an equally weighted vote.269
Though the one-person, one-vote doctrine resolved the problem of malapportioned districts, it did not constrain self-interested districting.270 The equal-population standard is just that: a requirement that each district contain the same number of
people. It says nothing about who those people are or how the district lines will be
determined. As the Supreme Court soon recognized, computerized districting and
mapping technology “make it relatively simple to draw contiguous districts of equal
population and at the same time to further whatever secondary goals the State has.”271
Moreover, the normative commitment to equal-population districts means that
state legislatures are affirmatively required to adjust district boundaries after each
decennial census to account for demographic shifts. The redistricting process provides politicians with a regularly scheduled opportunity to manipulate district boundaries to secure their own reelection and maximize their party’s representation in the

266. MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, REDISTRICTING AND COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS, IN THE
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY 222, 228 tbl.10-1 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds.,
2006) (summarizing state districting processes); ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING (July 30, 2017),
http://redistricting.lls.edu/states.php [https://perma.cc/D293-6DZU] (discussing the redistricting processes of various states).
267. Kang, supra note 10, at 683 (“Self-dealing incumbents can and do substitute their
political interests as the overriding priority for redistricting in place of any broader sense of
the public good.”); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 681
(2013) (arguing that politicians create districts that serve their self-interest).
268. See supra notes 41–42.
269. See supra notes 49–57.
270. Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 759
(2004) (“While the doctrine has substantially equalized the populations of legislative districts
throughout the country, it does not directly prohibit redistricting authorities from gerrymandering district lines in a way that unfairly favors one political party and disfavors another.”).
271. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735, 748–49 (1973); Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 313, 324 (2003) (“New computer technology has moved the gerrymander from
an art to a science, making it far easier to create districts of equal population with any desired
political configuration.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1609, 1669 (2017) (“[S]ophisticated computer algorithms allow for the creation of voting districts with equal population and just about any political configuration.”).
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legislature.272 Thus, in the decades since the reapportionment revolution, self-interested districting manifests through aggressive and often creative manipulation of district lines to entrench incumbents and weaken political opponents by “packing” them
into supermajority districts or “cracking” them between several districts. 273
In the aftermath of the reapportionment cases, several states considered adopting
statewide weighted-voting plans to comply with the quantitative one-person, onevote requirement without redistricting.274 Proponents argued that weighted voting
would enable states to continue to use counties as the basic unit of representation on
the state legislature and prevent gerrymandering. 275 Critics objected that weighted
voting generates unacceptable inequality in legislative representation. 276
Representatives with more votes are simultaneously more powerful on the legislative
body and less accessible to their constituents. Courts sided with critics, rejecting
statewide weighted-voting plans for failing to equalize legislative representation. 277
Local legislatures, however, have continued to experiment with weighted-voting,
incorporating it into their apportionment plans to preserve fixed electoral districts
that correspond to political subdivisions. The evolution of weighted-voting plans is
a credit to local political innovation and participatory democracy. The Supreme
Court has long recognized that “[v]iable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal
arrangements to meet changing urban conditions.” 278 The Court’s notably flexible

272. Cox, supra note 270, at 759–60, 760 n.46 (citing arguments that equal-population
districting facilitates gerrymandering); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 42, at 570–77
(arguing that redistricting enables gerrymandering); Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs,
Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 441–42 (2015) (noting that
districting “presents politicians with the valuable opportunity to choose their voters”); Laura
Royden & Michael Li, Extreme Maps, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1 (2017), https://www
.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20Maps%205.16.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/L345-93FG] (noting that redistricting “provides an enormous opportunity for
politicians” to manipulate the map “to create a more favorable set of districts for themselves
and for their party”).
273. Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 557–64 (2011) (describing packing and cracking);
Rave, supra note 267, at 681 (describing techniques for gerrymandering); Corinna Barrett
Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1609, 1670 (2017) (redistricting permits the
party in power to “‘pack’ like-minded voters into districts to ensure that a particular party
wins, and ‘crack’ the voting strength of the opposing party’s constituents across districts to
ensure that it loses”).
274. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1842–43.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Burns v. Gill, 316 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Haw. 1970); Bannister v. Davis, 263 F.
Supp. 202, 209 (E.D. La. 1966); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
League of Neb. Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D. Neb. 1962); Jackman v.
Bodine, 43 N.J. 491 (1964); Brown v. State Election Bd., 369 P.2d 140, 149 (Okla. 1962).
278. Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967); see also Abate v. Mundt, 403
U.S. 182, 185 (1971) (quoting Sailors); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, 397
U.S. 50, 59 (1970) (quoting Sailors).

2018]

THE NEX T RE A PP OR TI ON ME N T R EVO L UTI O N

1071

approach to the one-person, one-vote requirement at the local level, enables local
governments to serve as laboratories of democracy and experiment with various
forms of political representation and voting rights. The opportunities for innovative
governance increase exponentially at the local level, not only because there are far
more local governments than there are states, but also because policy experiments
that could never gain traction at the state level, can frequently find support in a
smaller arena. In many cases, innovative policies that begin at the local level stimulate change at the state and national level.
This Article seeks to stimulate such change by drawing attention to the evolution
of hybrid weighted-voting apportionment plans. As New York counties have discovered, combining weighted-voting with equal-population or multimember apportionment plans enables them to harmonize districting priorities that would otherwise conflict. Cortland County, for example, uses weighted-voting to eliminate the deviation
produced by its roughly-equal-population districts.279 Schenectady County recently
incorporated weighted-voting into its multimember apportionment plan to reduce the
plan’s deviation.280 Warren County uses weighted-voting in both ways.281
Hybrid-weighted-voting plans maintain fixed electoral districts that preserve representation for political subdivisions and prevent gerrymandering. These plans satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement by granting each district a
percentage of the total number of votes that is equal it its percentage of the total
county population. In addition, hybrid weighted-voting plans equalize legislative
representation by increasing the number of representatives from more populous areas.282 In a hybrid apportionment plan, each legislator represents roughly the same
number of people and casts roughly the same number of votes. Each legislator can
perform all his or her non-voting functions, such as serving on committees and
providing constituent services. Each has an equal seat at the table and an opportunity
to represent their constituents on all legislative matters. Legislator power is not artificially enhanced by the number of residents in each district.
Moreover, combining weighted-voting with equal-population districts also reduces the risk of racial vote dilution. Weighted-voting systems have the potential to
suppress racial minorities because each representative is elected at large. 283 Thus, a
geographically concentrated minority group, that would constitute a majority of an
equal-population district, may constitute only a minority of a larger, more populous,
weighted-voting or multimember district. As a result, the minority group may be unable to elect any representatives.
The traditional remedy where at-large elections cause minority vote dilution has
been to divide the jurisdiction into equal-population districts, each of which would
elect just one representative.284 Yet, equal-population districting has proved vulner-

279. See supra Part III.B.1.
280. See supra Part III.B.2.
281. See supra Part III.B.3.
282. See supra Part III.B.
283. Ostrow, supra note 5, at 1872–73.
284. Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral
Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 339 (1998); see also
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able to gerrymandering. Incorporating weighted-voting into equal-population apportionment plans remedies both concerns: fixed district boundaries eliminate the risk
that boundaries will be gerrymandered to reduce representation for racial minority
groups, and rough population equality reduces the risk that racial minorities will be
submerged within a larger district.
CONCLUSION
This Article highlights local innovations in weighted voting apportionment to provide a model for broader state and national reform. In particular, this Article demonstrates that equal-population apportionment plans maximize the advantages of each
apportionment system: (i) weighted-voting equalizes the numeric weight of each
vote, enabling legislatures to satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote doctrine
while maintaining fixed electoral districts that preserve representation for political
subdivisions and prevent gerrymandering, (ii) rough population equality mitigates
inequalities in legislative representation by assuring that each legislator represents
roughly the same number of people and casts roughly the same number of votes, (iii)
rough population equality also reduces the risk of that racial minorities will be submerged within a larger district.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34–42 (1986) (affirming lower court ruling providing for
single-member district remedy in Voting Rights Act challenge to North Carolina multimember
state legislative districts).

